中部部会
2025.04.11
中部部会2025(令和7)年度第1回研究報告会のご案内の件
日本金融学会中部部会会員各位
日本金融学会 中部部会
部会長 岡野衛士
名古屋市瑞穂区瑞穂町字山の畑1
〒467-8501
名古屋市立大学大学院経済学研究科気付
E-mail: eiji_okano@econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp
Tel and Fax: 052-872-5721
中部部会2025(令和7)年度第1回研究報告会のご案内の件
標記の件、以下の通り日本金融学会中部部会2025(令和7)年度第1回研究報告会を開催いたしますのでご案内いたします。皆様のご参加を心よりお待ち申し上げます。
記
日本金融学会中部部会2025(令和7)年度第1回研究報告会
日時：
2025 (令和7) 年5月7日水曜日16時30分～18時00分
場所：
名古屋市立大学 滝子キャンパス 3号館 大学院第3教室 (1階)
名古屋市瑞穂区瑞穂町字山の畑1〒467-8501
参加登録：
以下サイトでの参加登録が必要 (5月2日金曜日17時締切)
報告者:
Maurizio Iacopetta 先生 (SKEMA Business School and OFCE Sciences Po, Paris)
テーマ：
Common Ownership, Investment, and Economic Growth: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis
要旨:
This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of common ownership in a growth model with industry dynamics. Common ownership occurs when financial investors hold stakes in companies that compete in the product market. The paper integrates three widely debated mechanisms through which common ownership affects corporate decisions: corporate governance, business stealing, and industry knowledge spillovers. It examines how these mechanisms influence product quality, firm entry, and firm size, and explores their aggregate consequences.
In an economy with common ownership, the typical firm is less inclined to invest in quality expansion compared to an economy without common ownership, as the firm’s majority shareholder holds stakes in rival firms. The dynamic interaction between common ownership, firm size, entry, and quality expansion gives rise to hump-shaped investment patterns.
Quantitative analysis, calibrated to the U.S. economy, suggests that an increase in common ownership—measured by the magnitude assessed by Azar and Vives (2021) for the U.S. between 1985 and 2015—leads to a 1.76% decline in the quality of corporate governance. It also results in a long-run decrease in corporate investment relative to GDP by 0.09%, and a long-run decline in the economy’s rate of growth by 0.046%. Although, in the short run, the payout-to-GDP ratio increases by 0.35%, it declines by 0.21% in the long run.
The paper also studies the welfare consequences of these developments.
Keywords: Common Ownership, Industry Dynamics, Agency Problems, Internal Investments, Quantitative Analysis
JEL Codes: O31, O33, C63, L22, G34
ご注意:
- 報告言語は英語です。
- 研究報告会終了後、報告者を囲んで懇親会を開きます (18時30分から、参加費4,000円、場所は桜山駅周辺)。
- 参加にあたり以下サイトでの参加登録が必要です (5月2日金曜日17時締切)
照会先：岡野衛士 (名古屋市立大学)